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Strategic delegation in a sequential model with
multiple stages
Paraskevas V. Lekeas∗ Giorgos Stamatopoulos†
Abstract
We analyze strategic delegation in a Stackelberg model with an arbi-
trary number, n, of firms. We show that n − 1 firms delegate their
production decisions and only one firm (the one whose manager is the
first mover) does not. The later a manager commits to a quantity,
the higher his incentive rate. Letting u∗i denote the equilibrium payoff
of the firm whose manager commits in the i-th stage, we show that
u∗n > u
∗
n−1 > · · · > u
∗
2 > u
∗
1. We also compare the delegation out-
come of our game with that of a corresponding Cournot oligopoly and
show that managers who commit late (early) are given higher (lower)
incentive rates than managers in the Cournot market.
Keywords: Sequential competition; late-movers’ advantage; delegation
1 Introduction
The Stackelberg model of market competition is a benchmark model of industrial
economics. In this model, firms select their market strategies (quantities or prices)
sequentially. One of the most important issues in this framework focuses on the
relation between timing of commitment and relative profitability of firms. For the
case of two players, Gal-Or (1985) showed that if reaction functions are downwards-
sloping then the first-mover earns a higher payoff than his opponent. On the
other hand, in the case of upwards-sloping reaction functions the advantage is
with the second-mover.1 Further studies showed that this result is not robust to
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1The result of Gal-Or (1985) is obtained in a set-up which includes the Stackelberg
duopoly as a special case.
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variations of the model. Gal-Or (1987) studied a Stackelberg duopoly where firms
compete under private information about market demand. In this model the first-
mover might earn a lower profit than his opponent, as he produces a relatively
low quantity in order to send a signal for low demand. Liu (2005) analyzed a
model where only the first-mover has incomplete information about the demand
and showed that in some cases the first-mover loses the advantage.
For the case of n ≥ 2 symmetric firms, Boyer and Moreaux (1986) and Ander-
son and Engers (1992) showed that the i-th mover obtains a higher profit than the
i+1-th mover, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n−1. Pal and Sarkar (2001) analyzed a model with
n ≥ 2 cost-asymmetric firms under the assumption that the later a firm commits
to a quantity, the lower its marginal cost. They showed that if cost differentials
are sufficiently low, the firm that moves in stage i obtains a higher payoff than its
successor i+ 1; otherwise, the ranking of profits is reversed.
Recently, an integration of the Stackelberg model with the theory of endoge-
nous objectives of oligopolistic firms has taken place. The latter theory was
launched with the works of Fershtman and Judd (1985), Vickers (1985) and Sklivas
(1987). These works endogenized the objective functions of firms in a context of
management/ownership separation by postulating that firms maximize a combina-
tion of revenue and profit or quantity and profit. This framework was applied by
Kopel and Loffler (2008) to a Stackelberg duopoly with homogeneous commodities
(which give rise to downwards sloping reaction functions). Their paper analyzed
the impact of delegation on the structure of first versus second mover advantage.
The authors showed that only the second mover delegates the production decision
to a manager. As a result, the second mover produces a higher quantity than the
first mover and earns higher profit.
The current paper analyzes strategic delegation in a Stackelberg model with an
arbitrary number of firms. It assumes a fixed order of play and perfect observability
of choices at each stage.2 Our work is an extension of the strategic delegation setup
presented in Kopel and Loffler (2008).3 Our aim is to determine the relations
among: (i) the timing of commitment to quantities; (ii) the equilibrium delegation
decisions and (iii) the relative performance of firms. Moreover, we are interested in
comparing the equilibrium of the sequential market with that of a corresponding
Cournot market.
The main results of the paper are as follows: First, we show that all firms
delegate their production decision to managers except for the firm whose manager
is the first to commit to a quantity. Moreover, the equilibrium incentive rate is
an increasing function of the order of commitment. Namely, the later a manager
selects a quantity, the higher his incentive rate he is given. More importantly,
letting u∗i denote the equilibrium payoff of the firm whose manager commits in
stage i, we show that u∗n > u
∗
n−1 > · · · > u
∗
2 > u
∗
1. This ordering of profits is due
2The dropping of the last assumption is not without consequences. We disuss this at a
later point.
3Kopel and Loffler also considered investment in R&D, but the present paper focuses
on their delegation setup in an n-firm oligopoly.
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to the result that the managers who commit at late stages choose relatively high
quantities (as they are given relatively high incentive rates).
Delegation in a Cournot model leads to an equilibrium where all firms end-
up with a lower payoff compared to the case of non-delegation. This is not true
though for the Stackelberg model: Firms whose managers decide on quantities after
a threshold stage prefer the delegation regime over nondelegation. Nonetheless,
we show that if the number of firms is n ≥ 3, each firm in the Stackelberg market
earns a lower payoff than a Cournot firm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
and section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The framework
Consider an n-firm sequential oligopoly. Firms face the inverse demand function
P = max{a−Q, 0}, where P is the market price and Q is the total market quantity
given by Q = q1+ q2+ ...+ qn, where qi is the quantity of firm i = 1, 2, · · · , n. The
production technology of firm i is represented by the cost function C(qi) = cqi,
i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Firms are characterized by ownership-management separation. The
task of firm i’s manager is to select a quantity by maximizing an objective function
delegated to him by the owners of the firm. We assume that this objective function
is a combination of profit and quantity (Vickers 1985),4
Ti = (P − c)qi + aiqi, ai ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n
where ai is manager i’s incentive rate. The time structure of the interaction
among firms and managers is as follows. In stage 0, the firms’ owners decide
simultaneously on the incentive rates of their managers. In particular, firm i’s
owners choose ai so as to maximize the profit function
ui = (a−Q− c)qi, i = 1, 2, · · · , n
These choices are made publicly known. Then play becomes sequential. In stage 1
the manager of firm 1 selects (and commits to) a quantity for his firm. His choice
is observed by all other players. In stage 2, firm 2’s manager selects a quantity,
which is observed by all other players. The process continues this way in stages
3, 4, · · · , n− 1, n.
We denote the above interaction by GS . In the next section we identify the
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome of this game.
4The results of this paper do not change if we assume that the objective function of
each firm is a convex combination of profit and revenue (Fershtman and Judd 1985, Sklivas
1987).
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3 Results
3.1 Quantity stages
Working backwards, we first analyze the quantity competition stages of Gs. We
first note that, in essence, managers choose quantities as if their firms face as-
symetric marginal costs given by (c1, c2, · · · , cn) = (c − a1, c − a2, · · · , c − an).
Thus depending on the 0-stage choices of (a1, a2, · · · , an) and the resulting asym-
metries we can have, a priori, some managers selecting zero quantities. We will
show though that any configuration with one ore more managers selecting zero
quantities cannot be part of a SPNE outcome of GS .
We begin by describing the managers’ reaction functions. It will be useful
for our analysis to define not only the standard reaction function but also the
auxiliary concept of step k reaction function where k is a positive integer) on
which we elaborate below.
Let Qi = q1 + q2 + · · · + qi−2 + qi−1. Consider first stage n. We will denote
by f1n(q1, ..., qn−1) the step 1 reaction function or simply the reaction function of
manager n, defined by5
f1n(q1, · · · , qn−1) = argmax
qn≥0
Tn(q1, · · · , qn)
where Tn(q1, · · · , qn) = (a−Q− c+ an)qn. For the moment we do not discuss the
positiveness or not of the reaction functions; we will turn to this (critical) issue
later on in the analysis. Moving to stage n − 1, the (step 1) reaction function of
manager n− 1 is
f1n−1(q1, · · · , qn−2) = argmax
qn−1≥0
Tn−1(q1, · · · , qn−1)
where
Tn−1(q1, · · · , qn−1) = (a−Q
n−1 − qn−1 − f
1
n − c+ an−1)qn−1
Then the step 2 reaction function of manager n is derived by f1n when qn−1 is
replaced by f1n−1, i.e.,
f2n(q1, · · · , qn−2) = f
1
n|qn−1=f1n−1
Moving on to stage n− 2, the step 1 reaction function of manager n− 2 is defined
by
f1n−2(q1, · · · , qn−3) = argmax
qn−2≥0
Tn−2(q1, · · · , qn−2)
5Whenever there is no confusion, we will drop the variables q1, q2, etc., from the
definitions of the various reaction functions. For notational simplicity, the definitions do
not include the incentive rates.
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where
Tn−2(q1, · · · , qn−2) = (a−Q
n−2 − qn−2 − f
1
n−1 − f
2
n − c+ an−2)qn−2
Plugging f1n−2 into f
1
n−1 and f
2
n will give us the step 2 reaction function of manager
n− 1 and the step 3 reaction function of manager n. These are respectively,
f2n−1(q1, ..., qn−3) = f
1
n−1|qn−2=f1n−2 , f
3
n(q1, · · · , qn−3) = f
2
n|qn−2=f1n−2
We can iteratively continue this way and define the reaction functions up to stage
2. Then, in stage 1, manager 1 solves maxq1≥0T1(q1) where
T1(q1) = (a− q1 −
n∑
k=2
fk−1k − c+ a1)q1
Let q∗1 denote manager 1’s choice. Then the choice of manager 2 is q
∗
2 = f
1
2 (q
∗
1);
of manager 3 is q∗3 = f
2
3 (q
∗
1) = f
1
3 (q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) up to manager n’s choice which is q
∗
n =
fn−1n (q
∗
1) = · · · = f
1
n(q
∗
1 , · · · , q
∗
n−1).
The above description will be useful in order to examine what type of quantity
configurations can support an SPNE outcome of GS . To this end, consider the
generic stage i. Using our description, manager i selects qi in order to maximize
the function6
Ti(q1, · · · , q1) = (a−Q
i − qi −
n∑
k=i+1
fk−ik − c+ ai)qi
Notice that
∂Ti(q1, · · · , qi)
∂qi
= a−Qi − 2qi −
n∑
k=i+1
(fk−ik −
∂fk−ik
∂qi
qi)− c+ ai
.
Recall that f1i (q1, · · · , qi−1) denotes manager i’s (step 1) reaction function. Then
the concavity of Ti in qi (which can be easily established) implies that if
∂Ti(q1, · · · , 0)
∂qi
≤ 0
then f1i (q1, · · · , qi−1) = 0 whereas if
∂Ti(q1, · · · , 0)
∂qi
> 0 then f1i (q1, · · · , qi−1) > 0.
These conditions in turn imply that:
(i) if Qi +
∑n
k=i+1 f
k−i
k (q1, · · · , 0) ≥ a− c+ ai then f
1
i (q1, · · · , qi−1) = 0 and
(ii) if Qi +
∑n
k=i+1 f
k−i
k (q1, · · · , 0) < a− c+ ai then f
1
i (q1, · · · , qi−1) > 0.
We argue that case (i) cannot be part of any SPNE outcome. To this end,
consider a vector (a˜1, a˜2, · · · , a˜n) of 0-stage choices. Assume that these choices
6To be consistent, when dealing with T1 we need to set Q
1 = 0.
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are such that all managers select positive quantities except for one, say man-
ager i. Let (q˜1, · · · , q˜i−1, 0, q˜i+1, · · · , q˜n) denote this market outcome. Given that
q˜k = f
k−i
k (q˜1, · · · , q˜i−1, 0), k = i+ 1, i + 2, · · · , n, and since we are in case (i), we
have
∑
j 6=i q˜j ≥ a− c+ a˜i. But then the profit of any firm j, j 6= i, in stage 0 is
uj = (a− q˜1 − · · · − q˜n − c)q˜j ≤ (a− (a− c+ a˜i)− c)q˜j = −a˜iq˜j ≤ 0
To put it differently, a configuration of the form (q˜1, · · · , q˜i−1, 0, q˜i+1, · · · , q˜n) can-
not support an SPNE outcome as such a configuration would make the mar-
ket price fall bellow the marginal cost. To see this, notice that the conditions∑
j 6=i q˜j ≥ a− c+ a˜i and a˜i ≥ 0 imply that a−
∑
j 6=i q˜j ≤ c. A similar argument
holds for outcomes under which more than one managers select zero quantities.
Hence in what follows we can focus our attention on the case where all firms
produce positive quantities.
Since in any SPNE outcome all managers produce positive quantities, we can
use the results of Pal and Sarkar (2001) who computed the equilibrium quantities
in an n-stage Stackelberg with cost-asymmetric firms (but without delegation)
under the assumption that all firms are active. By adjusting their analysis to ours,
the manager of firm i chooses the quantity
q∗i = (P
∗ − c+ ai)2
n−i, i = 1, 2, · · · , n (1)
where
P ∗ =
a
2n
+
n∑
i=1
c− ai
2i
is the market price.
3.2 Delegation stage
Armed with the above, we can move to stage 0 (the delegation stage). Let
(a1, a2, · · · , an) = (ai, a−i). Using (1), the payoff of firm i in stage 0 is
ui(ai, a−i) = 2
n−i(
a
2n
+
n∑
j=1
c− aj
2j
− c)(
a
2n
+
n∑
j=1
c− aj
2j
− c+ ai)
The maximization problem facing firm i’s owners ismaxaiui(ai, a−i), i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Define Di = 2
i+1/(σ(i)−1), σ(i) = (2i+1−2)/(2i−2) and h(n) = −2+2n+22−n.
Lemma 1. Consider the delegation stage of GS.
(i) The equilibrium incentive rates are
a∗1 = 0, a
∗
i = Di
a− c
2nh(n)
> 0, i = 2, 3, · · · , n
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(ii) The inequalities a∗n > a
∗
n−1 > · · · > a
∗
2 > a
∗
1 hold.
Proof. Appears in the Appendix.
By Lemma 1 all firms except for 1, delegate in equilibrium. Moreover, the later
a manager commits to a quantity, the higher his incentive rate. To give some
intuition behind this result, we first note that there is a negative relation between
any ai and the market price. For example, consider firms i and i+ j with j > 0.
The corresponding effects of ai and ai+j on the market prices are
∂P ∗
∂ai
= −
1
2i
<
∂P ∗
∂ai+j
= −
1
2i+j
.
To comprehend why the above inequality holds, let us go back to the managers’
(step 1) reaction functions: the rate ai appears in the step 1 reaction functions
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of q1, · · · , qi−1, qi whereas the rate ai+j appears in the step 1 reaction of more
terms, i.e. q1, · · · , qi, · · · , qi+j−1, qi+j. Furthermore: (i) the relation between ai
and any of q1, · · · , qi−1 is negative and so is the relation between ai+j and any
of q1, · · · , qi, · · · , qi+j−1; (ii) the market price depends negatively on quantities.
Points (i) and (ii) explain why ai+j has a smaller negative impact on price than
ai has. As a result, the owners of firm i+ j have incentive to make their manager
more aggressive than firm i’s owners.
Using Lemma 1, market price, individual and total market quantities are given
respectively by
P ∗S =
a
2n−1h(n)
+
c(1 + n2n − 2−n)
2n−1h(n)
(2)
q∗iS = (2− 2
1−i)
a− c
h(n)
, i = 1, 2, · · · , n (3)
Q∗S = (a− c)[1− 2
−n +
2n− 4 + 22−n
2nh(n)
] (4)
Let u∗i denote the equilibrium profit of firm i, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, in GS . Our next
result ranks these profits.
Proposition 1. The inequalities u∗n > u
∗
n−1 > · · · > u
∗
2 > u
∗
1 hold in GS.
Proof. Since firms face the same price and they are cost-symmetric, u∗i+1 > u
∗
i if
and only if q∗i+1 > q
∗
i , i = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1, which holds by inspection of (3).
One question raised at this point is how does the performance of firms in GS
compare with their performance in a sequential market without any delegation
7Recall by the previous footnote that for reasons of notational simplicity we have not
included the incentive rates within the definitions of the reaction functions.
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activities. Let u¯i denote the equilibrium profit of the i-th firm in the latter market.
We have the following.
Corollary 1. There exists a stage i′ = i′(n) such that u∗i > u¯i if and only if
i > i′(n).
Proof. Appears in the Appendix
Therefore, firms whose managers select quantities after the i’th stage prefer the
delegation regime over nondelegation; the opposite holds for the remaining firms.
This result is explained by our previous finding that the late-moving managers are
relatively aggressive at the expense of the early movers.
3.3 Comparison with Cournot competition
In this section we compare the equilibrium outcome of GS with the outcome of
the corresponding Cournot market. In the latter framework, we have a two stage
interaction which evolves as follows: in stage 0, firms’ owners choose the incentive
rates of their managers. These choices are made publicly known. Then in stage 1,
the managers of the n firms select simultaneously quantities for their firms, using
the incentive schemes decided upon in stage 0. Let GC denote this game (which
was first analyzed by Vickers, 1985).
It is known that in the absence of delegation, the Stackelberg market produces
a higher total quantity than the Cournot market (Anderson and Engers, 1992).
When delegation is introduced then: (i) In GS not all firms delegate; (ii) in GC all
firms delegate. Hence a direct ranking of the Stackelberg and Cournot total market
quantities under certain delegation is not obvious. Corollary 2 bellow provides this
comparison. It also compares incentive rates and profiles across the two frameworks
(in what follows, Q∗C , a
∗
C and u
∗
C denote the equilibrium total market quantity,
incentive rate and profit8 respectively under Cournot competition).
Corollary 2. Consider the games GS and GC . The following hold.
(i) For any n ≥ 2, Q∗S > Q
∗
C .
(ii) For any n ≥ 2, a∗n > a
∗
C and a
∗
C > a
∗
i , i = 1, 2, · · · , n − 1.
(iii) For n = 2, u∗2 > u
∗
C > u
∗
1; for n ≥ 3, then u
∗
C > u
∗
i , for all i.
Proof. Appears in the Appendix.
Corollary 2 shows an interesting relation: All firms in GS , except for the last mover,
choose lower incentive rates than firms in GC . Nonetheless, regarding consumers,
the Stackelberg market remains more efficient than the Cournot market as it results
to a higher market quantity.
8Due to the symmetry of the model, all firms in the Cournot market choose the same
incentive rate and have the same profit in equilibrium.
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In the absence of delegation, Anderson and Engers (1992) compared the prof-
itability in the Stackelberg and Cournot models: for n = 2; the first (second)
mover earns a higher (lower) profit than the Cournot duopolists; for n ≥ 3, all
Stackelberg firms earn a lower profit than the Cournot firms. When delegation
is introduced and n = 2, the second (first) mover earns a higher (lower) profit
than the Cournot duopolists (this case is analyzed by Kopel and Loffler, 2008); for
n ≥ 3, all Stackelberg firms earn a lower profit than the Cournot firms (Corollary
2(iii)).
Let us, at this point, recall our assumption that each stage’s choices are per-
fectly observable. The issue of imperfect observability in strategic games has been
analyzed in a series of works. Katz (1991) demonstrated that if delegation choices
are not observed by rivals then delegation has no value. Bagwell (1994) showed
that observing the rival’s action with noise destroys the impact of first mover’s
commitment. Vardy (2004) analyzed a sequential game where observing the first
mover’s choice is costly. He showed that being the first mover has no value, no
matter how small the observation cost is. Other authors delivered more positive
results: Fershtman and Kalai (1997) provided a framework where the value of del-
egation can be restored, provided there is a positive probability that the delegation
contracts are accurately observed. van Damme and Hurkens (1997), Guth et al.
(1998) and Maggi (1999) showed that commitment under imperfect observability
has an impact on the outcome of the game if one allows for either mixed strategy
equilibria (first two papers) or for private information on behalf of the first mover
(last paper).
Contributing to the above discussion is not a goal (or an ambition) of the
current paper. Just to provide some real-world facts we quote from Scalera and
Zazzaro (2008):
”· · · the assumption of contract observability seems in some cases to be quite
realistic. When firms compete to hire managers, it is likely that contractual clauses
are publicly declared.”
Further, the same present the argument that
”· · · in many countries, at least as regards quoted companies, firms are obliged
by regulators to announce manager compensations to the market and this eases
their commitment to the contracts signed with managers.”9
4 Conclusions
We analyzed strategic delegation in a Stackelberg model with an arbitrary number
of firms. We showed that the later a firm’s manager commits to a quantity, the
higher his firm’s profit. Delegation improves the payoff of the late-movers and hurts
early-movers. Namely, firms whose managers commit late (early) to a quantity
end-up with a higher (lower) payoff compared to the non-delegation regime. This
9Katz (1991) questions the impact of this type of announcements as they refer to the
actual payments of the managers and not to the rules that generate these payments.
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is different from the case of delegation under Cournot competition, where all firms
are hurt by delegation.
Our paper has analyzed a framework with linear demand and cost functions.
Introducing a more general framework will allow us to examine the robustness
of our results. Further the analysis of a market where incentive contracts are
imperfectly observed is of special interest.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Notice that
∂ui(ai, a−i)
∂ai
> 0⇔
1
2i
(
a
2n
+
n∑
j=1
c− aj
2j
− c+ai)+(
a
2n
+
n∑
j=1
c− aj
2j
− c)(1−
1
2i
) > 0
or iff
ai < (
a− c
2n
−
∑
j 6=i
aj
2j
)
2i(2i − 2)
2i+1 − 2
Clearly, for i = 1, the derivative is negative and hence the equilibrium incentive
rate that firm 1 chooses is a∗1 = 0. Let now i ≥ 2. Then the reaction function of
firm i is given by
ai =
{
0, if
∑
j 6=i aj/2
j ≥ (a− c)/2n,
2i
σ(i) [(a− c)/2
n −
∑
j 6=i aj/2
j ], if
∑
j 6=i aj/2
j < (a− c)/2n.
where σ(i) = (2i+1 − 2)/(2i − 2), i ≥ 2. We first notice that in any equilibrium
of the delegation game only firm 1’s owners choose a zero incentive rate; all the
remaining firms choose positive incentive rates. To see this, consider an outcome
ai = 0 and aj > 0, j = 2, · · · , i − 1, i + 1, · · · , n, j 6= i. The market price is
P =
a
2n
+
n∑
i=1
c− ai
2i
. Since ai = 0, we have
∑
j 6=i aj/2
j ≥ (a − c)/2n. But then
it is easy to show the last inequality implies that the corresponding price would
fall below the marginal cost c. Hence we restrict attention to the case where∑
j 6=i aj/2
j < (a− c)/2n for all i. Then we have the system
1
22
a2 +
1
23
a3 + · · ·+ σ(i)
1
2i
ai + · · · +
1
2n
an =
a− c
2n
, i = 2, 3, ..., n (5)
σ(i) = 2
i+1−2
2i−2
. Using (5) the equations for firms i and 2 we get,
ai =
σ(2)− 1
σ(i)− 1
2i−2a2 (6)
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and hence
a2 =
a− c
2n−2
(σ(2) +
n∑
i=3
σ(2)− 1
σ(i)− 1
)−1 (7)
It is straightforward to show that σ(2) +
n∑
i=3
σ(2) − 1
σ(i) − 1
= −2 + 2n+ 22−n ≡ h(n).
Using then (6) and (7), the solution for ai, i ≥ 2, is a
∗
i = Di
a− c
2n
1
h(n)
, where
Di =
2i+1
σ(i) − 1
.
(ii) Notice that a∗i+1 > a
∗
i if and only if Di+1 > Di or 2
i+2/(σ(i + 1) − 1) >
2i+1/(σ(i) − 1), which holds because σ(i + 1) < σ(i).
Proof of Corollary 1. The equilibrium profit of the i-th mover in GS is u
∗
i =
(a − c)2(1 − 2−i)/[2n−2[h(n)]2] whereas the profit of the same firm in a market
without delegation activities is u¯i = 2
−i(a − c)2/2n. Then, u∗i > u¯i if and only if
22+i > 4+[h(n)]2. Let r(i) = 22+i. It is easy to show that r(1) < 4+[h(n)]2 < r(n);
further, r(i) is increasing in i. Hence there exists a unique i′(n) < n such that
u∗i > u¯i if and only if i > i
′(n).
Proof of Corollary 2.(i) Consider the last stage of GC . The quantity that the
manager of firm i chooses is
qiC(a) = max{(a− n(c− ai) +
∑
i 6=j
(c− aj))/(n + 1), 0}, i = 1, 2, ..., n
Equilibrium delegation schemes are
a∗i = a
∗
C =
n− 1
n2 + 1
(a− c), i = 1, 2, · · · , n
Hence, individual and total market quantities are given respectively by
q∗iC = q
∗
C =
n(a− c)
n2 + 1
, Q∗C =
n2(a− c)
n2 + 1
, i = 1, 2, · · · , n
Recall that market quantity in GS is
Q∗S = (a− c)[1− 2
−n +
2n− 4 + 22−n
2nh(n)
]
It is then easy to show that Q∗S > Q
∗
C if and only if (n − 1)2
1+n + 2 − 2n2 > 0
which holds.
(ii) Notice that a∗i > a
∗
C iff 2
i+1 > 4+[(n−1)2nh(n)]/(n2+1). Define the function
w(i) = 2i+1 and notice that w(n−1) < 4+ [(n−1)2nh(n)]/(n2+1) < w(n). Since
w(i) is strictly increasing in i, we conclude that a∗i < a
∗
C for i = 1, 2, · · · , n−1 and
a∗n > a
∗
C .
(iii) The equilibrium profit of the i-th mover in GS is u
∗
i =
4(1− 2−i)
2n[h(n)]2
(a− c)2
whereas the profit of each firm in GC is
10 u∗C =
n
(n2 + 1)2
(a− c)2. Notice that
u∗i > u
∗
C if and only if 4− 2
2−i >
n2n(h(n))2
(n2 + 1)2
. Let y(n) denote the right part of
the last inequality. For n ≥ 3, y(n) > 4 > 4 − 22−i. On the other hand, if n = 2,
u∗1 = (a− c)
2/18 < u∗C = 2(a− c)
2/25 < u∗2 = (a− c)
2/12.
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